On analyse les déterminations de la notion d’« usage » chez le premier Heidegger du début des années 1920 et chez le Wittgenstein des Recherches philosophiques. On distingue ainsi la notion d’usage de celle de « pratique de vie », plus précisément de celles d’« accomplissement » et de « forme » de vie pour montrer que, tout en étant très différents, usages heideggériens et usages wittgensteiniens sont des usages spécifiques, déterminés par les contextes qui leur résistent. On s’intéresse ainsi (...) tout particulièrement à la notion d’« indication formelle » heideggérienne et au caractère thérapeutique, délibérément non herméneutique, du « contexte » des Recherches.This paper focuses on the determinations of the notion of « use » in the early Heidegger – from the 1920’s – and in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. It aims to distinguish the notion of « use » from the one of « life’s practice », and more precisely, from the two notions of « life’s achievement » and « form of life ». The objective is to point out that, although they are indeed very different, Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s notions of « use » both are specific and determined by their resistance to a context. This paper will therefore dwell more specifically on the analysis of the Heideggerian notion of « formal indication » and of a therapeutic and non hermeneutic notion of context in the Investigations. (shrink)

In this paper we present two compatible hypotheses to explain interest in celebrity gossip. The Learning Hypothesis explains interest in celebrity gossip as a by-product of an evolved mechanism useful for acquiring fitness-relevant survival information. The Parasocial Hypothesis sees celebrity gossip as a diversion of this mechanism, which leads individuals to misperceive celebrities as people who are part of their social network. Using two preliminary studies, we tested our predictions. In a survey with 838 respondents and in-depth interviews with 103 (...) individuals, we investigated how interest in celebrity gossip was related to several dimensions of the participants’ social lives. In support of the Learning Hypothesis, age proved to be a strong predictor of interest in celebrities. In partial support of the Parasocial Hypothesis, media exposure, but not social isolation, was a strong predictor of interest in celebrities. The preliminary results support both theories, indicate that across our life span celebrities move from being teachers to being friends, and open up a list of future research opportunities. (shrink)

In this paper we prove that in modules, MS-measurability depends on being able to define a measure function on the p.p. definable subgroups. We give a classification of abelian groups in terms of measurability. Finally we discuss the relation with Q[t]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{Q}[t]}$$\end{document} -valued measures.

One night in 2017, ‘Grace’ went on a date with actor Aziz Ansari. She later described the date as “the worst experience with a man I’ve ever had,” and accused him of sexual assault. In a statement, he responded by saying that the sexual activity was completely consensual. While Grace felt pressured, uncomfortable, and violated, he was convinced that the sexual acts were consensual. How is it possible that a man who describes himself as an ally to the feminist cause (...) engages in such unacceptable actions and seems incapable of understanding them for what they are, that is, acts of sexual violence? And how is it possible that a woman who feels uncomfortable is still incapable of resisting further advances? In this paper, I argue that such cases have to be understood within the framework of a ‘sexist ideology,’ that is, a social structure that constrains our actions and epistemic tools of interpretation. What hinders Ansari from understanding the act as sexual violence and what hinders Grace from resisting Ansari is the complex set of interconnected sexist practices which determine who owes what to whom based on different gendered roles. (shrink)

The progress of electronic health technologies and biobanks holds enormous promise for efficient research. Evidence shows that studies based on sharing and secondary use of data/samples have the potential to significantly advance medical knowledge. However, sharing of such resources for international collaboration is hampered by the lack of clarity about ethical and legal requirements for transfer of data and samples across international borders. Here, the International Clinical Trial Center Network reports the legal and ethical requirements governing data and sample exchange (...) across four continents. The most recurring requirement is ethical approval, whereas only in specific conditions approval of national health authorities is required. Informed consent is not required in all sharing situations. However, waiver of informed consent is only allowed in certain countries/regions and under certain circumstances. The current legal and ethical landscape appears to be very complex and under constant evolution. Regulations differ between countries/regions and are often incomplete, leading to uncertainty. With this work, ICN illuminates the unmet need for a single international collaborative framework to facilitate DSE. Harmonising requirements for global DSE will reduce inefficiency and waste in research. There are many challenges to realising this ambitious vision, including inconsistent terminology and definitions, and heterogeneous and dynamic legal constraints. Here, we identify areas of agreement and significant difference as a necessary first step towards facilitating international collaboration. We propose the establishment of a working group to continue the comparison across jurisdictions, create a standardised glossary and define a set of basic principles and fundamental requirements for DSE. (shrink)

The inconsistency between pro-environmental attitudes and behaviours, known as the “attitude-behaviour” gap, is exceptionally pronounced in scenarios associated with “green” choice. The current literature offers numerous explanations for the reasons behind the “attitude-behaviour” gap, however, the generalisability of these explanations is complex. In addition, the answer to the question of whether the gap occurs between attitudes and intentions, or intentions and behaviours is also unknown. In this study, we propose the moral dimension as a generalisable driver of the “attitude-behaviour” gap (...) and investigate its effectiveness in predicting attitudes, pro-environmental intentions and subsequent behaviours. We do so by using Hunt–Vitell’s moral philosophy-based framework of ethical decision-making, which conceptualises morality as the central decision-making parameter. The results from 557 US MTurk participants revealed that the manipulation of moral dimensions, specifically deontology and teleology, impacted ethical evaluation of presented dilemmas, however, failed to translate into subsequent intentions and behaviours. This finding suggests (i) that the moral dimension has an effect in shaping attitudes toward environmental issues, and (ii) that gap occurs between attitudes and intentions rather than intentions and behaviours. Further investigation of what strengthens and/or overrides the effects of the moral dimension would help understand the reasons why moral attitudes do not always translate into subsequent intentions and behaviours in the pro-environmental domain. (shrink)

Das Weltbild der Demokratie im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. ist gepragt von Irrationalitat und Willkur, wie die Untersuchung des Ostrakismos, der politischen Prozesse und des Denunziantentums zeigt. Das Verhaltnis der Intellektuellen zu diesem Weltbild spiegelt sich in Leitkonzepten wie Physis, Techne und Metabole. Die Abgrenzung der intellektuell-rationalistischen Weltsicht von anderen Sichtweisen weist auf einen radikalen Erkenntniszweifel. Als der Demos die Verfugungsgewalt uber das Politische erreichte, ruckten die Intellektuellen von der, das Politische beherrschenden, Wirklichkeit des Demos ab. (Franz Steiner 1993).

Contrairement à sa réception anglo-saxonne, la réception en France de l’idéal-réalisme d’Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) n’a encore jamais fait l’objet d’une étude spécifique. Cet article entreprend de combler cette lacune en se centrant sur un aspect particulier de cette réception, soit le rapport entretenu en France à la philosophie de Lotze comme un spiritualisme dont l’enjeu n’est pas uniquement métaphysique, et dont les implications s’étendent à la question religieuse. Il s’attache en même temps à reconstruire les possibles raisons d’un constat paradoxal (...) : comment la philosophie de Lotze a-t-elle pu à la fois se voir reconnue en France dans toute son importance, et n’avoir pas reçu dans la philosophie française elle-même de prolongement vraiment décisif? (shrink)

Fred Adams and Charlotte Shreve ABSTRACT: Last year Charlotte Shreve and I presented an argument that synesthesia contains evidence against higher order thought theories of consciousness. Rocco Gennaro took up the challenge and argued that H.O.T. theories like his could handle the example and dismiss the argument. Below we suggest...

L’article examine le rôle de l’interprétation dans la compréhension du sens d’un énoncé, selon une perspective contextualiste. Dans l’héritage des travaux inauguraux de Frege, de Wittgenstein et d’Austin, les principaux représentants du contextualisme – Charles Travis par excellence – soutiennent que la compréhension des critères qui fixent le sens des énoncés requiert un ancrage en contexte. Ces critères tiennent lieu de standard de correction de l’application des propriétés sémantiques. Mais dire que l’application des propriétés sémantiques d’un énoncé requiert la compréhension (...) des critères qui sont discriminants dans un contexte, est-ce pour autant affirmer que le locuteur interprète librement quel critère est pertinent et donc qu’il peut interpréter différemment le sens d’un même énoncé qu’un autre locuteur qui est dans la même situation ? Le premier enjeu de l’article est de montrer, à l’encontre de toute conception relativiste de la compréhension, que les critères du sens sont normés de manière conventionnelle et donc, qu’en contexte, il n’y a jamais qu’une interprétation possible des critères. L’interprétation est imposée par le contexte qui la norme. Dans ces conditions, cela a-t-il un sens de parler d’interprétation du sens de l’énoncé ? Le deuxième objectif du texte est d’examiner si, localement, la compréhension des énoncés du langage ordinaire peut cependant tolérer une, et donc plusieurs interprétations. L’article distingue alors deux processus : l’interprétation des signes du langage qui se justifie dès lors que les signes en question sont ambigus et l’interprétation du sens de l’énoncé qui s’impose dans un cas bien circonscrit, en cas d’absence ou du moins de méconnaissance du contexte. Il distingue alors plusieurs concepts d’ « interprétation » : l’interprétation qui consiste à substituer un symbole par un autre pour traduire un énoncé ambigu en langage ordinaire et l’interprétation qui ne se surajoute pas à la compréhension mais qui n’est autre que le processus de donation de sens lui-même et dont l’enjeu est exclusivement clarificateur. (shrink)

L’idée d’appropriation (oikeiōsis) constitue un concept fondamental de l’éthique stoïcienne. On en souligne l’efficacité polémique dans la controverse opposant les Stoïciens aux Épicuriens sur la fin (telos) naturelle ainsi que la portée théorique dans l’explication du développement moral et social de l’homme. Outre les difficultés rencontrées pour cerner les contours et la consistance théoriques de l’appropriation, son statut est également fortement débattu : s’agit-il d’une invention stoïcienne ou bien en trouve-t-on l’équivalent ou les linéaments dans la philosophie péripatéticienne ? Tout (...) en rappelant les incertitudes entourant la généalogie de cette idée, on entreprendra de se tourner vers le traitement philosophique du propre (oikeion) dans certains textes d’Aristote et de Platon, pour voir s’il contient des déterminations pertinentes pour comprendre l’appropriation. Cet examen sera l’occasion de s’interroger sur ce qui a pu passer du propre à l’appropriation et sur les difficultés auxquelles s’expose la confrontation de deux notions au statut conceptuel inégal. (shrink)

This paper provides an account of the paradoxes of teaching democracy, the paradoxes of being a citizen in a liberal democracy, and the insights that can be gained from the model of citizenship that T.H. Green promoted. Green thought citizenship was predicated on the twin foundations of the community and the common good. Freedom for Green means individual self-determination coupled with recognition of the dependency relations between individuals and the community. Green is noteworthy not only as a theorist but also (...) as an active contributor to the development of public schools in England. A consideration of his arguments provides a model for educating citizens, addresses the paradoxes of democracy in education, and reveals elements of his philosophy that are relevant to educational issues today. (shrink)

resumo É possível distinguir ao menos três etapas principais nas abordagens filosóficas da noção de sujeito: na etapa metafísica a estrutura do sujeito é pens a da em termos de substância; na etapa transcendental , o sujeito é visto como polarida de unificadora de horizontes; na etapa psic a na l í t ica, o sujeito é de f i n ido como estrutura vazia. O sujeito tra ns c e nde ntal é uma estrutura para o mu ndo, enqua (...) nto o sujeito psicanalítico precisa ter uma estrutura em si me s mo para estruturar sua ausênc ia ontológica. Para Lacan, essa ausênc ia ont o l ó g ica se torna manifesta me d ia nte a ling ua gem. A estrutura do sujeito é concebida como uma estrutura de significação. Este artigo compara esses três pontos de vista sobre o sujeito e discute que relevância a idéia de estrutura pode ter para a compreensão do conceito. palavras-chave Sujeito metafísico; sujeito transcendental; sujeito psic a nalítico; estrutura; Platão; Kant; Fichte; Lacan. (shrink)

Schelling demandait: 'Pourquoi y a-t-il du sens, non du non-sens au lieu du sens?' Dans cette question, la notion n'est pas un signe renvoyant à quelque chose, pas plus que lorsque l'on dit communément non pas d'un énoncé, mais d'une chose, d'un état de fait, qu'ils 'ont un sens' ou non. Comment aborder philosophiquement cette version du sens? Notre ouvrage part d'une conviction : la structure philosophique sous-tendant l'idée du sens s'ouvre avec Kant, dans la mesure où on peut le (...) définir, pour commencer, comme le renvoi d'une réalité donnée à l'horizon d'une réalité (ou d'une idéalité) simplement postulée, que l'on peut certes nommer, mais pas directement connaître. Ainsi par exemple de Dieu. On cherche ainsi à cerner comment le sens est devenu une catégorie directrice de la philosophie, constamment au travail dans les variations de l'idéalisme, l'émergence de la phénoménologie, des philosophies de la vie, de l'existence, de la culture, de la psychanalyse."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

En considérant la fabrique cinématographique comme une expérience politique et artistique, et un film terminé comme le lieu d’un regard singulier d’un·e cinéaste, cet article entend analyser le rapport au temps qu’entretiennent les acteurs·trices de la scène cinématographique au Liban depuis les trois dernières années. Du soulèvement de 2019 à l’année 2022, la relation au temps se caractérise par une incertitude constante qu’il convient d’explorer, avec d’une part les temporalités de la fragmentation liées au contexte du pays, et d’autre part, (...) les temporalités de la conception d’une œuvre. Comment est-ce que la temporalité de la création d’un film, souvent longue et difficile, s’imbrique-t-elle dans les multiples temporalités du pays faites d’une accumulation de crises? (shrink)

Research ethics committees in Germany usually don’t have philosophers as members and if so, only contingently, not provided for by statute. This is interesting from a philosophical perspective, assuming that ethics is a discipline of philosophy. It prompts the question what role philosophers play in those committees they can be found in. Eight qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted to explore the self-perception of philosophers regarding their contribution to research ethics committees. The results show that the participants generally don’t view themselves (...) as ethics experts. They are rather unanimous on the competencies they think they contribute to the committee but not as to whether those are philosophical competencies or applied ethical ones. In some cases they don’t see a big difference between their role and the role of the jurist member. In the discussion section of this paper I bring up three topics, prompted by the interviews, that need to be addressed: (1) I argue that the interviewees’ unwillingness to call themselves ethics experts might have to do with a too narrow understanding ofethics expertise. (2) I argue that the disagreement among the interviewees concerning therelationship between moral philosophy and applied ethicsmight be explained on a theoretical or on a practical level. (3) I argue that there is some lack of clarity concerning therelationship between ethics and lawin research ethics committees and that further work needs to be done here. All three topics, I conclude, need further investigation. (shrink)

In this article, we will describe higher order thought theories of consciousness. Then we will describe some examples from synesthesia. Finally, we will explain why the latter may be relevant to the former.

We show that a complete first-order theory T is distal provided it has a model M such that the theory of the Shelah expansion of M is distal.

First surprise! You make the brain itself into an idea, and consequently, also the five senses and the whole body. Thus you can no longer talk about sensations; that would be saying that a great idea, an idea of specific dimensions or an infinite number of small ideas, however you feel like explaining it to us, becomes the vehicle that seizes all other ideas, except of course yours, which finds no place there and doesn’t come up [to the mind].

This article examines the notorious mid-nineteenth-century American trial of Amelia Norman, who was acquitted - very much against the weight of the evidence - of attempting to kill the man who seduced her. In particular, we explore the role in the trial and its aftermath of the affective energies and cultural expectations set in motion by best-selling American sentimental novels like Hannah Foster's "The Coquette" and Susanna Rowson's "Charlotte Temple." In Norman's case, once newspapers, defense lawyers, and reformers such (...) as Lydia Maria Child recast the defendant as a sentimental heroine, the trial became about seduction, not attempted murder. The sentimental emplotment of Norman's life marshaled a powerful set of emotional responses and moral judgments on her behalf. For example, Norman claimed insanity. And since sentimental heroines are supposed to go mad when they are seduced and abandoned, the jury was prepared to interpret her symptoms according to her lawyers' very strategy for establishing her innocence. Ultimately, however, Norman embodied the plight of the sentimental heroine at the same time that she contested her fictional counterpart's fate. In this way, her trial spectacularized the disparity which the sentimental novel conjures up and displaces but never resolves. Going further, the common law theory of coverture, which severely limited the legal personhood of married women, has received a great deal of scholarly attention. Cases like Norman's remind us that unmarried women were also subject to draconian constraints on their legal personhood. The tort of seduction is a key example. Legal historians trace the development of the seduction tort from its common-law origins, when men's property interest in women's bodies formed the basis of the cause of action, to 1851, when Field Code authors (including Norman's lawyer, David Graham) persuaded several states to grant seduced women standing to bring their own cause of action. Consequently, courts were forced to reckon with the seduced woman as a moral agent capable of consenting to sex. As trials like Norman's demonstrate, sentimental novels helped lay the groundwork for this shift in the law by elucidating a subjectivity for the seduced woman. Yet the doctrinal implications of Norman's precedent-setting trial had a second, more ambiguous strain. Other women facing similar charges used the same legal strategy to gain acquittals in a substantial number of cases. Indeed, Norman's sentimental strategy proved so powerful that men on trial for killing their wives' seducers appropriated it to bring their own stories before juries and to reinforce male sexual norms through the so-called honor defense. In the end, then, Norman's trial fostered legal reform, but it also suggested - as Lydia Maria Child's fictionalization of the case in "Rosenglory" recognized - that only sustained and multifaceted efforts to change cultural as well as legal norms could improve the sexual status of women. In addition to its legal, literary, and historical insights that it provides, we also intend this article to contribute to debates on the nature of scholarship in law and literature. Scholars such as Wai Chee Dimock have argued for a focus on the historical and historically shifting relations between law and literature - a view we endorse. Where we differ from Dimock is in our diversion of attention away from abstract ideas of law laid out by treatise writers and philosophers in favor of law experienced and manipulated by individuals. So, too, we are interested less in representations of concepts such as justice in legal and literary texts than we are in the ways in which literature (broadly conceived) can create provisional and fragile opportunities for concrete instantiations of justice and even generate legal change (for good or ill). We would argue that to the extent legal change motivates rather than simply mirrors cultural change, it needs literature to be effective. This project, then, responds to Gregg Crane's call for attention to the complex and slippery historical interactions of law and literature that shape and are shaped by an ever changing cultural idiom of justice. The extended story of Amelia Norman, in short, not only constitutes a case study in the inescapable interaction between the overlapping and interdependent discourses of law and literature, but also reveals the literary and legal consequences of that interaction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Radical Change Theory and Synergistic Reading for Digital Age YouthEliza T. Dresang (bio) and Bowie Kotrla (bio)Books with digital age characteristics... stimulate curiosity and foster community.—Elizabeth Lennox Keyser, 1999Today’s students think and process information fundamentally differently from their predecessors.—Marc Prensky, 2001PrologueOne of our favorite books is McGillis’s The Nimble Reader: Literary Criticism and Children’s Literature.1 McGillis applies various literary theories—among them the New Criticism, structuralism, feminism, and postmodernism—to much-loved, (...) time-honored books such as E. B. White’s Charlotte’s Web (1952), in each case coming up with a fresh interpretation of a well-known text. The Nimble Reader makes the point that the meaning of any object, experience, or creative endeavor can be evasive and changes according to the lens through which it is viewed. Theory uncovers, illuminates, reveals, explains, predicts, and adds value and dimensions to what otherwise might have been overlooked. [End Page 92]That is what we hope Radical Change Theory does—we hope that it stimulates thinking, brings new perspectives, and adds value to what is already recognized as an immense treasure: the body of children’s literature and the young (and old) readers who love and appreciate it. As an addition to the assortment of approaches McGillis covered, we anticipate that Radical Change Theory is a way to see the mosaic of contemporary children’s literature in a new light, to examine and explain some parts of it that may have gone unnoticed. We offer it as a way to think about contemporary youth in relation to their literature, and we suggest applying Radical Change Theory in retrospect in order to highlight and appreciate “radical” authors and illustrators of the past who wrote for “radical readers” in their times. Radical Change Theory is only one perspective among many, and we realize that the phenomena it addresses could be explained or augmented in other ways, as McGillis demonstrated.IntroductionThe 2008 Caldecott Award for the most outstanding picture book for children published in the United States in the previous year was presented to Brian Selznick, author and illustrator of The Invention of Hugo Cabret, which is hundreds of pages longer than an ordinary picture book.2 Approximately 300 of its 533 pages are wordless black and white sketches that tell the story—not illustrating the text but replacing it. Hugo Cabret is a twelve-year-old boy living in the walls of a Paris train station in 1931; he becomes involved in a mystery adventure with the pioneer silent film maker George Méliès, a fitting element for a largely visual book. Selznick notes that he thinks of the book as somewhere between a graphic novel, a picture book, and a film.3 Each sequence of drawings can itself become a miniature silent move if the reader employs a flipbook technique. Hugo Cabret offers a highly interactive reading experience with vivid visual appeal, intertextuality, and multiple layers of meaning. It also provides a dramatic departure from the typical picture-book tradition and joins a number of other radically changed books that have special appeal for digital age youth.While it was perfectly clear to almost everyone during the 1990s that technology was changing, almost no one acknowledged the concomitant change in a sizeable and growing cadre of handheld books for youth. Some of those who did notice expressed puzzlement and regret at the break from a more traditional form and format; others expressed curiosity. Some others sought explanations.4 One purpose of this essay is to provide one explanation for the nature and character of these “changed” books and to demonstrate that they are somewhat different from but firmly rooted in more traditional children’s literature.But not only are books changing—at least some young readers are as well. In the 1990s, as youth who were born in the late 1970s began to mature, [End Page 93] we, along with some other educators and scholars, noted what seemed to be a change from previous generations in how many youth approached thinking, learning, creating, and engaging with media, including reading handheld books. Various terms, including the net generation, digital natives... (shrink)

_Essays on Politics and Society_ brings together the most significant writings on the topic by the acclaimed Victorian historian, social critic, and essayist Thomas Carlyle. This volume includes some of his most well-known and influential pieces, such as "Characteristics" and "Chartism." In keeping with the Norman and Charlotte Strouse Edition of the Writings of Thomas Carlyle, these essays are accompanied by a thorough historical introduction to the material, extensive notes providing historical and cultural context while expanding on references and (...) allusions, and a textual apparatus that carefully details and explains the editorial decisions made in reconciling the editions of each essay. (shrink)

Our paper explores how the affective energies and cultural expectations set in motion by best-selling American sentimental novels like Hannah Foster's The Coquette and Susanna Rowson's Charlotte Temple informed the notorious mid-nineteenth-century American trial of Amelia Norman, who attempted to kill the man who seduced her. Once newspapers, defense lawyers, and reformers such as Lydia Maria Child recast the defendant as a sentimental heroine, the trial became about seduction, and Norman was acquitted against the weight of the evidence. Sentimental (...) novels turn on the contrast between the passive victim status of the heroine and the active libidinal quest of the rake-villain. As Cathy Davidson points out, this fiction is "about silence, subservience, stasis (the accepted attributes of women as traditionally defined) in contradistinction to conflicting impulses toward independence, action, and self expression (the ideals of the new American nation)." The seduction plot diverts attention from this disparity by establishing an affective solidarity between heroine and reader and elevating the ruined woman to a tragic status. The sentimental emplotment of Norman's life marshaled a powerful set of emotional responses and moral judgements on her behalf. Norman claimed insanity. And since sentimental heroines are supposed to go mad when they are seduced and abandoned, the jury was prepared to interpret her symptoms according to her lawyers' very strategy for establishing her innocence. Ultimately, however, Norman embodied the plight of the sentimental heroine at the same time that she contested her fictional counterpart's fate. In this way, her trial spectacularized the disparity which the sentimental novel conjures up and displaces but never resolves. The common law theory of coverture, which severely limited the legal personhood of married women, has received a great deal of scholarly attention. Cases like Norman's remind us that unmarried women were also subject to draconian constraints on their legal personhood. The tort of seduction is a key example. Legal historians trace the development of the seduction tort from its common-law origins, when men's property interest in women's bodies formed the basis of the cause of action, to 1851, when Field Code authors (including Norman's lawyer David Graham) persuaded several states to grant seduced women standing to bring their own cause of action. Consequently, courts were forced to reckon with the seduced woman as a moral agent capable of consenting to sex. As trials like Norman's demonstrate, sentimental novels helped lay the groundwork for this shift in the law by elucidating a subjectivity for the seduced woman. Yet the doctrinal implications of Norman's precedent-setting trial had a second, more ambiguous strain. Norman's sentimental strategy proved so powerful that men on trial for killing their wive's seducers appropriated it to bring their own stories before juries and to reinforce male sexual norms. In the end, then, Norman's trial fostered legal reform, but it also suggested - as Child's fictionalization of the case in "Rosenglory" recognized - that only sustained and multifaceted efforts to change cultural as well as legal norms could improve the sexual status of women. Scholars such as Wai Chee Dimock have argued for a focus "on the historical and historically shifting relations between law and literature" - a view we endorse. Where we differ from Dimock is in our diversion of attention away from abstract ideas of law laid out by treatise writers and philosophers in favor of law experienced and manipulated by individuals. So, too, we are interested less in representations of concepts such as justice in legal and literary texts than we are in the ways in which literature (broadly conceived) can create provisional and fragile opportunities for concrete instantiations of justice and even generate legal change (for good or ill). Going further, we would argue that to the extent legal change motivates rather than simply mirrors cultural change, it needs literature to be effective. Thus, we see no need to characterize - and indeed reject the depiction of - law as "a limited arena" in which ideas of morality have little place. This project, then, responds to Gregg Crane's call for attention to "the complex and slippery historical interactions of law and literature that shape and are shaped by an ever changing cultural idiom of justice." The extended story of Amelia Norman not only constitutes a case study in the inescapable interaction between the overlapping and interdependent discourses of law and literature, but also reveals the literary and legal consequences of that interaction. (shrink)

In response to Fred Adams and Charlotte Shreve’s (2016) paper entitled “What Can Synesthesia Teach Us about Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?”, previously published in Symposion, I argue that H.O.T. theory does have the resources to account for synesthesia and the specific worries that they advance in their paper, such as the relationship between concepts and experience and the ability to handle instances of ‘pop-out’ experiences.

In Gennaro (2016), I had originally replied to Fred Adams and Charlotte Shreve’s (2016) paper entitled “What Can Synesthesia Teach Us About Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?,” previously published in Symposion. I argued that H.O.T. theory does have the resources to account for synesthesia and the specific worries that they advance in their paper, such as the relationship between concepts and experience and the ability to handle instances of ‘pop-out’ experiences. They counter-reply in Adams and Shreve (2017) and also (...) raise further objections to H.O.T. theory which go well beyond the scope of their 2016 paper. In this paper, I offer additional replies to the points they raise in Adams and Shreve (2017). (shrink)

J. T. Ismael's monograph is an ambitious contribution to metaphysics and the philosophy of language and mind. She tackles a philosophical question whose origin goes back to Descartes: What am I? The self is not a mere thing among things--but if so, what is it, and what is its relationship to the world?

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Method in Ancient PhilosophyDavid K. GliddenJyl Gentzler, editor. Method in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. viii + 398. Cloth, $72.00.The fifteen papers in this collection constitute revisions of conference proceedings and reflect the varied interests of participants. The ensemble exhibits a thoroughly modern methodology. Whatever and however various ancient methods of philosophy may have been, in Anglo-American scholarship it is standard practice to first address established (...) scholarly interpretations as the primary entry point to critical discussionóoften displacing antiquity with a critical vocabulary of philosophical modernity. Scholars may come to understand each other better, but at the risk of asking the wrong questions or sacrificing ancient texts themselves as mere means of producing papers.Most scholars are progressives. They believe philosophy has advanced past the comparatively primitive wisdom of antiquity, and so such scholars feel perfectly entitled to make better sense of ancient texts, by patiently explaining what the ancients would have meant had they only been able to get it right. There are, of course, exceptions. And some papers in this collection suggest deeper faith in our philosophic fathers. So, the battle between the ancients and the moderns is joined once more, between those who would adorn their papers with footnotes for their peers and those who would attempt more anthropological an inquiry into ancient philosophic practices.Ian Mueller and Robert Bolton each address the same passage in Plato's Phaedo, both beginning with an article from Vlastos, first published in 1969. Mueller thoughtfully explores three different yet related accounts of what we might call scientific method in explaining Plato's views on natural change. Bolton wonders whether scholars are asking the wrong questions. Patricia Curd attempts a progressivist account of Eleatic thought, notwithstanding her recognition of the paucity of ancient sources. Complete with elaborately numbered sentences, Gail Fine focuses primarily on Burnyeat (1976) on Plato on Protagoras. Constance Meinwald presents a rather near-sighted account of two passages in the Philebus that employ the peras-apeiron distinction, with a view toward Plato's allegedly modernist mathematization of understanding. Lesley Brown revisits five pages of the Sophist that were hotly debated in the 1960s. With charity and elegance, she offers several plausible solutions to puzzles posed by previous scholars. Sometimes time smoothes over differences.A. A. Long's essay on Plato's presentation of Socrates in the Theaetetus might appear more philosophically anthropological. Yet Long reveals progressive sympathies, suggesting that Plato dispatches Socrates in the Theaetetus, so as to prepare the way for a more rigorously academic form of philosophizing, such as that exhibited in the Sophist. [End Page 111] In this way, Long speculates, Plato abandoned practical ethics for the academic life of research, so familiar to university professors and conference participants. It might be hard to square such speculation with Plato's Laws and the reception of Plato's writings among his own contemporaries. Still, Socrates' shifting role in Plato's dialogues is well worth pondering.By comparison, T. H. Irwin's contribution is wonderfully old-fashioned. His paper addresses the background knowledge to be presumed by ancient readers of Plato's dialogues and how that knowledge is artfully put to use in Plato's depiction of Socrates' reflections on the unity of virtue. By speculating on Plato's relation to his ancient readers, Irwin displaces many modernist preoccupations, though not without himself falling victim to that peculiar scholarly obsession of dating Plato's dialogues by their doctrines.With characteristic conservatism, Gisela Striker cautions scholars not to over-read Aristotle's Prior Analytics. While that extraordinary work may have deep implications for the history of formal logic, it probably was instead intended to be part of a general account of argument. In a similar vein, Charlotte Witt attempts to rescue Aristotle from scholars who would delimit Aristotle's multifarious uses of the "for the sake of" explanation, which altogether pervade his metaphysics, physics, biology and ethics. Yet, Witt soon finds herself competing in a contest over interpretive distinctions, a sport that will certainly never capture Aristotle's own authorial intentions.Facing another mass of scholarship, in this case on Aristotle's dialectic, C. D. C. Reeve sensibly attempts to... (shrink)

Content Description The origins and uses of the classical moral theories / Roger Sullivan -- Wisdom as foundational ethical theory in Thomas Aquinas / Lawrence Dewan -- Descartes and the ethics of generosity / Leslie Armour -- Is pity the basis of ethics? : Nietzsche versus Schopenhauer / T.L.S. Sprigge -- Jacques Maritain and Karol Wojtyla : approches to modernity / Kenneth Schmitz -- On the foundations of ethics / Hugo Meynell -- Ethics, the humanities, and the formation of persons (...) / Thomas De Koninck -- Personal identity and the sense of duty / Elizabeth Trott -- Passing through : women's experiences and ethics / Monique Dumais -- Ladri'ere's eschatology of reason and the foundations of ethics / Louis Perron -- The foundations of ethics and moral practices / William Sweet. (shrink)

If you travel through airports, you can’t help but notice it. Jodi Picoult’s novels are everywhere. From Charlotte to Kansas City to Los Angeles, airport bookstores are consistently stocked with three or four or more of her most recent heavy volumes of fiction. Read one and you might mutter that it seems designed for a relatively mindless flight from one coast to the other. Read several and you might agree with National Public Radio’s disparaging view that the books are (...) “lurid tales of family strife . . . garnished heavily with medical jargon, legalese, and a punitive finger pointed at a mother.” It’s not hard to find negative comments about Picoult’s novels. Janet Maslin, writing for the New York .. (shrink)

Ethics; philosophy; linguistic analysis; western thought.

Following years of debate over the effectiveness of cognitive behavioural therapy for myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS), public health bodies in the UK and beyond have determined that no psychotherapy is clinically proven for this patient group. In the field of ME/CFS and the wider arena of ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ (MUS), patient survey data and qualitative research capturing patient experiences and psychotherapist attitudes suggest that therapeutic practice may sometimes fall short of required ethical standards. This raises questions about how psychotherapists (...) can safely support, as opposed to treat, people with these debilitating conditions. We consider four ethical principles that feature throughout psychotherapists’ codes of practice, those of respect, competence, responsibility and integrity, and discuss examples of good and poor practice in this arena as evinced by recent empirical literature. Following this, we offer a variety of suggestions to help strengthen ethical psychotherapy practice with patients with ME/CFS and other MUS. In terms of practitioner education, we recommend greater emphasis on humility, reflexivity and disability-affirming practices, exploration of personal as well professional ethics, and integration of patient expertise-by-experience, accompanied with the latest evidence, into foundational and ongoing training. In terms of ongoing practice, we suggest consideration of formalised patient-focused feedback systems and greater transparency vis-à-vis patient access to clinical notes. Finally, we underline the importance of elevating patients from mere subjects to co-producers of psychotherapy research. (shrink)

Biography of ʻAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ʻAyn al-Quḍāh al-Hamadhānī, d. 1131, a Muslim saint from Iran.

The so called "Knowledge Argument" of Frank Jackson 1 claims to show that there is something about the human mind that must inevitably escape the grasp of physical science: "There are truths about . . . people which escape the physicalist story" . In effect, materialism is false, and science, as opposed to metaphysics, cannot hope to attain to an understanding of consciousness.

al-qism 1. al-Fikr al-ʻArabī qabla "al-falsafah" wa-ḥattá tukhūmuhā -- [2. Without special title].

Neo-Nyaya treatise on verbal testimony presenting semantic approaches to Sanskrit case and suffix by Gadādhārabhaṭṭācārya, 17th/18th century; includes Tattvabodhinī Hindi commentary.

Comparative study on the philosophies of Rāmānuja, 1017-1137, propagator of Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Hindu philosophy and Swami Dayananda Saraswati, 1824-1883, founder of Arya-Samaj.

Women in Rock, Women in Romanticism is the first book-length work to explore the interrelationships between contemporary female musicians and eighteenth- and nineteenth-century art, music, and literature by women and men. The music and videos of contemporary musicians including Erykah Badu, Beyoncé, The Carters, Hélène Cixous, Missy Elliot, the Indigo Girls, Janet Jackson, Janis Joplin (and Big Brother and the Holding Company), Natalie Merchant, Joni Mitchell, Janelle Monáe, Alanis Morrisette, Siouxsie Sioux, Patti Smith, St. Vincent (Annie Clark), and Alice Walker (...) are explored through the lenses of pastoral and Afropresentism, Gothic, female Gothic, and the literature of William Blake, Beethoven, Arthur Schopenhauer, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Charlotte Dacre, Ralph Waldo Emerson, E.T.A. Hoffmann, Ann Radcliffe, William Shakespeare, Mary Shelley, her husband Percy Shelley, Henry David Thoreau, Horace Walpole, Jane Williams, Mary Wollstonecraft, and William Wordsworth to explore how each sheds light on the other, and how women have appropriated, responded to, and been inspired by the work of authors from previous centuries. (shrink)